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Chapter 3
The Self-declared Islamic State (Da‘esh) and Ius ad 
Bellum under Islamic International Law 
Mohamed Elewa Badar*
Abstract
In terms of international law, the militant group which calls itself the Islamic State (IS) 
naturally poses questions of illegitimacy in the context of the law of belligerency and 
International humanitarian law (ius in bello). However, the group claims to operate 
within a distinct and parallel law, i.e. Islamic (international) law and the support it 
enjoys stems directly from this claim. A focus on public international law alone would 
thus provide only an external claim to their illegitimacy, one which they and their many 
supporters would disregard as meaningless, since it could never be above divine com-
mands. In light of this and in light of the fact that in most Muslim majority states, secu-
larism has never obtained the respect it enjoys in the west, it is thus important to ask the 
questions of the legitimacy of this group, their actions and their political formations 
from within the norms of Islamic international law. This study therefore essentially 
aims to provide answers to questions already raised by many scholars and international 
organisations: What are the justifications for waging war on which the group relies? Are 
these justifications valid under Islamic international law? Who can declare jihād and 
under what conditions? Could their political formation rightfully claim to be a Caliphate 
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under Shariʿah? Why have the militants been denied the recognition of their chosen 
name by the vast majority of Muslims worldwide and have rather been branded with 
the derogatory acronym Da‘esh or named ‘the modern day Khārijites’? The answers to 
these questions are crucial because Da‘esh recruitment and rallying narrative relies on 
depicting their struggle as a just and noble jihād in line with the tenets of Islam. 
Arguably, this study would also assist any future prosecution of this group. It would help 
adjudicators in asserting the legitimacy of their judgments, if they were able to prove 
that such judgments are compatible with the legal and belief systems recognised by the 
actors at trial. 
Keywords
ISI/ISIL/ISIS/IS/DAESH – Islamic international law (siyar) – defensive and offensive 
jihād – ius ad bellum – jihādī-Salafism – Khārijites – excommunication (Takfīr) – abode 
of war (dār al-harb) – abode of Islam (dār al-Islam)
 Introduction
This article is written in the midst of a rapidly developing story, one which 
involves a Salafi-jihādi insurgent and terrorist group, declaring itself the 
Islamic State (IS) but referred to as Da‘esh by its opponents, who deny its 
 legitimacy.1 The tyrannical identity of these Salafi-jihādi insurgents was 
unknown to the western world until their frightening rise to power began to 
flag up on its radar in early 2013. Three years on and the harrowing presence of 
Da‘esh could not be more predominant throughout the consciousness of the 
international community. The rapid development of their power was brought 
to light when they entered Fallujah at the start of 2014, raising their black flag 
over the Governorate office and seizing key administrative buildings.2 
1 The acronym Da‘esh comes from al-Dawlah al-Islamīyah fī al-‘Irāq wa-al-Shām, (i.e. the Islamic 
State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) which was the initial title the militants gave themselves. 
However, since acronyms are rare in the Arabic language and have an unusual tone for the 
native speaker, the term Da‘esh plays the role of mocking the militants. ‘IS’ is referred to as the 
Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) or the 
Arabic acronym Da‘esh. The use of ‘Islamic State’ in this article in no way acknowledges or 
accepts the so-called Islamic State’s claim as a legitimate ‘Caliphate’, nor does it support its 
claims or ambitions in this respect. 
2 United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq Report on the Protection of Civilians in the Non-
international Armed Conflict in Iraq 5 June – 6 July 2014 (UNAMI/OHCHR July 2014) <www.ohchr.
org/EN/Countries/MENARegion/Pages/UNAMIHRreports.aspx>.
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The expansionist powers of Da‘esh have proven to be impressive, with 
their territorial control spanning over large parts of north-western Iraq and 
north-eastern Syria.3 In June 2014 they highlighted the strength of their mili-
tary organisation when they took control of Mosul, Iraq’s second largest city, 
distilling fear throughout humanity as the Iraqi Security forces (ISF)4 fled for 
their lives.5 Since then, Da‘esh have massacred countless civilians in both 
Iraq and Syria and further expansion had seen the fall of the provincial city 
Ramadi, the closest city to Baghdad, bringing Da‘esh one step closer to the 
capital.6 However, the end of 2015 and the beginning of 2016 marked a signifi-
cant loss of their controlled terrain in Iraq and Syria. In December 2015, they 
had lost control over more than 70 per cent of Ramadi and at the time of writ-
ing (July 2016) there is an ongoing military operation underway to liberate the 
city of Mosul from their control. In March 2016 they lost control of the ancient 
Syrian city of Palmyra and there are ongoing efforts by the US-backed Syria 
Democratic Forces (SDF) to retake al-Raqqa city. 
International concern escalated in 2015 as the group progressed into Libya, 
capturing the city of Sirte, the Ghardabiya Air Base, Great Man-Made River 
water project and Nofilia though recent reports show that government forces 
have gained ground against Da‘esh in Sirte.7 Libya gives the group cross-bor- 
der access to Niger and Chad, both of which facilitate direct contact with its 
expanding Nigerian ally Boko Haram.8 Da‘esh have also established them- 
3 For an up-to-date information on IS’s lost and controlled terrain in Iraq and Syria see recent 
ISIS sanctuary maps produced by the Institute of the Study War <http://www.understanding 
war.org>. 
4 There are three principal components of the ISF: the Iraqi Army (IA), the Iraqi Police (IP), and 
the National Police (NP). The Iraqi Army and the National Police are both national-level assets, 
with the IA under the command of the Ministry of Defense and the NP under the command 
of the Ministry of Interior respectively. Conversely, the IP are recruited and deployed within 
local communities. See Institute for the Study of War, Iraqi Security Forces <http://www.un 
derstandingwar.org/iraqi-security-forces>.
5 UNAMI Report on the Protection of Civilians in the Non-international Armed Conflict in Iraq 5 
June–6 July 2014 (UNAMI/OHCHR July 2014) <http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/IQ/
UNAMI_OHCHR_POC_Report_FINAL_6July_10September2014.pdf>.
6 OSC Report TRR2014111361251279, ‘The “Islamic State” Crisis and U.S. policy’ (CRS, May 27 2015) 
p10 (online) <http://mepoforum.sk/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/R43612.pdf>.
7 S.A. Zway and D.D. Kirkpatrick, ‘Western Officials Alarmed as ISIS Expands Territory in Libya’ 
New York Times, (New York, 31 May 2015); See also Nicholas Norbrook, ‘Libyan army gains 
ground against IS in Sirte’ The Africa Report, (22 June 2016). <www.theafricareport.com/North-
Africa/libyan-army-gains-ground-against-is-in-sirte.html>.
8 M. Scheuer, ‘Islamic State is Winning, America Must Soon Use Its One Remaining Option’ 
(Michael Scheuer’s Non-Intervention.com, 8 August 2015) <www.non-intervention.com/1765/
islamic-state-is-winning-america-must-soon-use-its-one-remaining-option/>.
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selves strongly in the Islamist communities of Bosnia, Kosovo, and Albania, 
and have a presence in each of the other Balkan states.9 In addition, they have 
developed a presence in Afghanistan where they seek to increase their rev-
enue streams through the country’s heroin production and mineral wealth.10 
Those who have fallen under Da‘esh control are subjected to an extremely 
radicalised version of Islam (jihādi-Salafism) with a primitive interpretation 
of Shariʿah law being implemented throughout the controlled territory. The 
ideology of Da‘esh also draws a great deal from the fundamentalist 18th cen-
tury religious doctrine Wahhabiyya, founded by Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wah-
hab (1703–1791). Even though the number of foreign fighters joining Da‘esh has 
to some extent decreased, over the course of the whole war more than 40,000 
citizens from 100 different countries have performed ‘migration’ (hijra) to join 
their ranks and defend the so-called ‘Caliphate’.11 According to the United 
Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI) 17,019 civilians have been killed in 
Iraq in 2014 at the hands of Da‘esh who proceed to use the holy name of Islam 
to justify their barbaric actions.12 Consequently the UN Human Rights Council 
has requested the High Commissioner to ‘dispatch a mission to Iraq to inves-
tigate alleged violations and abuses of international human rights law com-
mitted by ISIL and associated terrorist groups, and to establish the facts and 
circumstances of such abuses and violations, with a view to avoiding impu-
nity and ensuring full accountability’.13 
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid. A report released in September 2015 by the House Committee on Homeland Security 
estimated that these numbers have only grown, with at least 25,000 foreign fighters travel-
ling to join the Syrian conflict, including 250 Americans. See L. Curtis et al., ‘Combating 
the ISIS Foreign Fighter Pipeline: A Global Approach’, (Heritage Foundation, 6 January 
2016) <www.heritage.org/research/reports/2016/01/combatting-the-isis-foreign-fighter-
pipeline-a-global-approach>. 
11 Congressional Research Service, C.M. Blanchard et al., ‘The “Islamic State” Crisis and U.S. 
Policy’ (CRS Report Prepared for Members and Committee of Congress, 27 May 2015) 
<www.mepoforum.sk/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/R43612.pdf> ‘Is the Number of For-
eign Fighters Joining ISIS Really Plummeting’, World News (29 April 2016) <www.europe.
newsweek.com/isis-foreign-fighters-90-percent-iraq-syria-decreasing-general-claim-
453741?rm=eu>. 
12 United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq, Report on the Protection of Civilians in the Non-
International Armed Conflict in Iraq 11 September–10 December 2014 (UNAMI/OHCHR July 
2014) I, (online) <www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/IQ/UNAMI_OHCHR_Sep_Dec_ 
2014.pdf>. 
13 Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the 
Human Rights Situation in Iraq in the Light of Abuses of Abuses Committed by the so-
called Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant and associated groups, (UN Doc. A/HRC/28/18) 
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As the present article is concerned with the legitimacy of the group’s resort 
to war, an in-depth analysis, of ius ad bellum from an Islamic law perspec-
tive is conducted in order to highlight the core justifications which form the 
Da‘esh narrative with regard to waging war against their enemies. The article 
discusses the rise of the group before going on to assess their core rationale 
for waging war. This will then allow for a comparative analysis between the 
said rationale and the conditions permitting the resort to war under Islamic 
international law. The article will then discuss jihād in light of its theological 
evolution, stripping it to its core to establish its traditional meaning before 
discussing it in light of its various guises. Is it a doctrine of expansionary 
nature, justifying war for the purpose of spreading Islam, eradicating barriers, 
expanding the Caliphate, and removing jahili (ignorant) forms of governance? 
Or is it strictly defensive, justifying recourse to war only when necessary to 
defend Muslim lands, protection from oppression and persecution? The 
results of this discussion shall provide an answer as to whether the dynamic 
modus operandi of Da‘esh follows the requirements of defensive jihād and is 
therefore legitimate under Islamic law, or whether it is an illicit use of armed 
force closer in character to the crime of hirābah (brigandage, banditry, high-
way robbery), most severely punishable under Islamic law. The article will 
demonstrate that conditions permitting the use of force are strictly regulated 
by the Qur’ān, the hadith (oral traditions attributed to the Prophet) and the 
Sunna (historical narratives typically about the Prophet but also his compan-
ions). The article provides evidence of deliberate distortions of Qur’ānic exe-
gesis by Da‘esh whilst aiding the evaluation of their legal status in light of ius 
ad bellum under Islamic international law. 
 The Rise of Da‘esh
The radical ideological roots of Da’esh lie in the forces built and led by the 
late Abu Mus‘ab al Zarqawi.14 The Jordanian thug-turned-terrorist created 
the group jama‘at al-tawhid wal-jihād (Monotheism and Jihād) in 2003 which 
<www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/RegularSessions/Session28/Documents/A_
HRC_28_18_AUV.doc>. See also the recent report by the United Nations Human Rights 
Council, They Came to Destroy: ISIS Crimes Against the Yazidis (UN Doc. A/HRC/32/CRP.2, 
15 June 2016). The Commission’s report which focuses on violations committed in Syria 
has reached the following conclusion: ‘ISIS has committed the crime of genocide as well 
as multiple crimes against humanity and war crimes against the Yazidis, thousands of 
whom are held captive in the Syrian Arab Republic where they are subjected to almost 
unimaginable horrors’.  
14 CRS Report (n. 11) 2.
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would soon go on to become Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) (also known as Al-Qaeda 
in the land of the two rivers or Al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia) in 2004.15 Thriving 
on sectarian discrimination, the American invasion provided Zarqawi with an 
environment in which it was easy to instil his religious ideals and brutal tac-
tics into Iraq’s Sunni Muslims.16 After his death in 2006 an AQI spokesperson 
announced the creation of the Islamic State in Iraq (ISI) headed by Omar al-
Baghdadi as its Emir. The group’s power began to diminish, due to a series of 
successful joint US-Iraqi counterterror strikes, two of which killed Al-Qaeda 
leader Abu Hamza al Muhajir and Abu Omar al-Baghdadi in 2010.17 With ISI’s 
leadership in disarray, Dr Abu Bakr al Baghdadi (Ibrahim Awwad Al-Badri) 
ascended to lead the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). Due to his 
education in Islamic law far exceeding that of Al-Qaeda leaders, Abu Bakr was 
perfectly suited for the position.18 Baghdadi’s imprisonment at Camp Bucca 
enabled him to develop a network of trusted allies, ex-Ba’athist leaders, whom 
he would later use to rebuild the crumbled framework of ISI.19 
The period between 2011 and 2013 evidenced the rise of the Islamic State in 
Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) as the group consolidated its military control and 
financial capacity in north-eastern Syria.20 On the 9th April 2013, Baghdadi 
announced the merger of ISIL and Jabhat Al Nusra, establishing himself as 
the leader of both organisations. By the end of 2013, he turned his attention 
back to Iraq, and began conducting dozens of deadly attacks by exploiting the 
political downfall and the sectarian divide. The brutality of the attacks com-
bined with Baghdadi’s reluctance to pledge allegiance to Al-Qaeda led to the 
latter formally disavowing ISIL on 2 February 2014.21 From this point onwards 
15 G. Michael, ‘The Legend and Legacy of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi (2007) 7 Defence Studies 
338, 357. See also H. Solomon, Islamic State and the Coming Global Confrontation (Palgrave 
Macmillan 2016) 1–5. 
16 For more on the history of religious segregation between Sunni and Shi’a Muslims in Iraq 
see A. Hashim, ‘Insurgency in Iraq’, in P.B. Rich and I. Duyvesteyn (eds), The Routledge 
Handbook of Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency (Routledge 2012) 172–82.
17 M.J. Kirdar, ‘Al Qaeda In Iraq’ (Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 15 June 2011) 
5 <www.csis.org/analysis/al-qaeda-iraq> .
18 J. Stern and J.M. Berger, ISIS: The State of Terror (1st edn William Collins 2015) 37; Solomon 
(n 15) 5–10.
19 Ibid. 37.
20 United Nations Human Rights Council Report of the Independent International Commis-
sion of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic (A/HRC/27/CRP.3) (19 November 2014) 2 <www.
ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/IICISyria/Pages/IndependentInternationalCommission.
aspx> . 
21 A.Y. Zelin, ‘Al-Qaeda Disaffiliates with Islamic State of Iraq and Al-Sham’ (The Washington 
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ISIL continued to advance in both Iraq and Syria making territorial gains 
before capturing Mosul in early June, a city of 1.5 million people and Iraq’s 
largest dam.22
On 29 June 2014 Dr Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi emerged from the shadows to 
lead prayers at the great mosque in Mosul. Dressed in black, he presented 
himself as the heir to the Abbasid Caliphate as well as the embodied spirit 
of his heroic predecessor, Abu Mus‘ab al-Zarqawi.23 The official spokesper-
son and senior leader of Da‘esh, Abu Muhammad Al-‘Adnani ash-Shami 
(killed in Aleppo on August 2016) collectively addressed the Muslim com-
munity (ummah) and the rest of the world announcing the formation of an 
‘Islamic Caliphate’ with Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi being named Caliph (Amir al-
Mu‘minin or the Commander of the Faithful).24 
The self-declaration of the so-called Caliphate claims to unite the exec-
utive, legislative and judicial functions of Allah whilst claiming religious 
authority over all Muslims worldwide. Its creation had formed an integral 
part of the group’s rhetorical and military expansionist aims since the out-
set of their activities.25 The proclaimed Caliphate implied that there was now 
a unified and single Islamic ecosystem, with its own currency and army and 
that ‘all borders and barriers among Islamic countries are now invalid’.26 
At the time of writing, Da‘esh have claimed the establishment of, and con-
trol over, new provinces (wilayats) in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Afgha nis-
tan/Pakistan, Libya, Algeria, West Africa and the Caucasus region of Russia.27 
Institute, 4 February 2014) <www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/al-qaeda-
disaffiliates-with-the-islamic-state-of-iraq-and-al-sham>.
22 L. Sly and A. Ramadan, ‘Insurgents Seize Iraqi City of Mosul as security forces flee’ The 
Washington Post (June 10, 2014).
23 M. Weiss and H. Hassan, ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror (1st edn, Regan Arts 2015) 1. See also 
Solomon (n 15) 5–6. 
24 ‘The Return of Khilafa’ (Dabiq, issue 1, Ramadan 1435) 7 <www.clarionproject.org/news/
islamic-state-isis-isil-propaganda-magazine-dabiq>; G. Wood, ‘What ISIS’s Leader Really 
Wants, The longer he lives, the more powerful he becomes’ (New Republic, 1 September 
2014) <www.newrepublic.com/article/119259/isis-history-islamic-states-new-caliphate-
syria-and-iraq>
25 Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on 
the Syrian Arab Republic. Rule of Terror: Living under ISIS in Syria (A/HRC/27/CRP. 3, 19 
November 2014) 3.
26 R. Mortada, ‘What does ISIS’ Declaration of a Caliphate Mean?’ (Al-Akhbar English, 30 
June 2014) <www.english.al-akhbar.com/node/20378> (n 15) 3.
27 See D. Gartenstein-Ross et al., ‘The Islamic State’s Global Propaganda Strategy’ (Interna-
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In addition to this, Nigerian based Boko Haram28 and Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis 
in Northern Sinai have morphed into Da‘esh-affiliated armed movements 
after pledging allegiance to the group in March 2015 and November 2014, re-
branding themselves as the Islamic State in West Africa and wilayat Sinia 
respectively.29 
An audio message released by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, in May 2015 calling 
‘all Muslims [to] go to war everywhere; It is the duty of every Muslim’ reit-
erated the fear that Da‘esh continues to present a global threat.30 The mes-
sage further confirmed that Abu Bakr still enjoyed support from the group in 
his role as Caliph and put to rest claims that he had been incapacitated dur-
ing recent bombings and thereby had lost the legitimacy required for such a 
position.31 The call continues to persuade individuals all over the world and 
the group has thus recently claimed responsibility for terrorist attacks in the 
United States, Tunisia, France, Australia, Germany, Belgium, Kuwait, Saudi 
Arabia and Egypt. A major factor in the power of the group is the far-reaching 
ability of its members and agents advanced and sustained social media propa-
ganda. The use of religious doctrine and verses of the Qur’ān combined with 
modern day lexis, resonates with group’s vulnerable followers who are led 
to believe the atrocities committed by Da‘esh and their declaration of jihād 
are ‘just’ in the eyes of Islam. The catastrophic effect of this saw a shadow of 
devastation cast over Europe and indeed, the international community as a 
whole, on 13 November 2015 when 129 innocent civilians were killed in the 
city of Paris at the hands of Da‘esh affiliates. Simultaneous attacks saw gun-
men and suicide bombers hit the Bataclan concert hall, three restaurants/bars 
tional Centre for Counter-Terrorism Research Paper, March 2016) <www.icct.nl/wp-con 
tent/uploads/2016/03/ICCT-Gartenstein-Ross-IS-Global-Propaganda-Strategy-March 
2016.pdf>. See also CRS Report (n 11), 1.
28 For more information on Boko Haram’s ideology and their practices see M.E. Badar et al. 
‘The International Criminal Court and the Nigerian Crisis, An Inquiry into Boko Haram 
Ideology and Practices from an Islamic Law Perspective’ (2014) 3 International Human 
Rights Law Review 29. 
29 On and around November 2014 several jihādist armed groups from Algeria, Egypt, Libya, 
Saudi Arabia, and Yemen have pledged bay‘at (allegiance) to IS. In October 2014, in Yemen, 
a militant group named Supporters of the Caliphate in the Arabian Peninsula has also 
pledged bay‘at to Baghdadi. 
30 ‘Islamic State releases ‘al-Baghdadi message’’ BBC (London, 14 May 2014) <www.bbc.co.uk/
news/world-middle-east-32744070>.
31 ‘The rightful Caliph must be Muslim, fully grown, devout, sane, and physically whole. 
Because he is theoretically meant to lead Muslims in battle, missing limbs or a sickly dis-
position will automatically disqualify him. He must also hail from the Quraysh tribe of the 
Arabian peninsula’ see Wood (n 24).
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as well as the Stade de France, where French president Francois Hollande was 
attending an international football game.32 The terrorist attack, conducted by 
three co-ordinated teams is the deadliest to hit Europe since the 2004 Madrid 
bombings.33
 Da‘esh Use of Social Media as War Propaganda
The rapid development in technology, mass media and global communica-
tion has enabled Da‘esh to merge archaic religious references with modern 
tools. The group pushes its narrative through a number of media ranging 
from the internet, broadcast, traditional publications to video recordings in 
public parks and squares. In June 2014 Da‘esh started the al-Bayān radio sta-
tion in Mosul, which has been broadcasting readings of the Quran, lectures, 
and battlefield updates. The group also control several TV stations in Iraq 
and Syria. In addition to this, Da‘esh began circulating a publication written 
in English called Islamic State News (and later Islamic State Report), which 
glorified their initiative through descriptions of their battles and key poli-
cies. The publications were brief and relied on graphics to magnify the nar-
rative of Da‘esh. However in early July 2014 (Ramadan 1435 AH), the first issue 
of Dābiq was released; a glossy in-depth propaganda magazine with unprec-
edented digital reach.34 This has enabled Da‘esh to revive the appeal of jihād 
forming a severely effective recruitment tool. In the second propaganda pub-
lication: ‘The Flood’, the metaphor of the story of Noah is used to put across 
a stark message: you are either with the Da‘esh or against them and doomed 
to be destroyed. It calls on all Muslims around the world to pledge loyalty to 
the group and to move to their ‘so called Caliphate’ immediately.35 This pro-
32 ‘Paris attacks: What happened?’ BBC (London, 9 December 2015) <www.bbc.co.uk/news/
world-europe-34818994>. 
33 On 14 July 2016, another deadliest attack shocked France where a terrorist used a truck to 
run over people celebrating the 2016 Bastille Day in Nice, leaving 84 dead and 308 injured. 
IS has claimed responsibility of the attack. <www.theguardian.com/world/live/2016/
jul/14/nice-bastille-day-france-attack-promenade-des-anglais-vehicle>. On 26 July 2016, 
two terrorists attacked a church in Normandy, France killing a 86-year old priest. IS has 
claimed responsibility of the attack. <www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/26/france-
shock-second-isis-attack-12-days>.
34 M.E. Badar, ‘The Road to Genocide: The Propaganda Machine of the Self-Declared Islamic 
State’ (2016) 16 International Criminal Law Review 361, 367–368. 
35 ‘The Flood’ (Dabiq, issue 2, Ramadan 1435) 20 <www.clarionproject.org/news/islamic-
state-isis-isil-propaganda-magazine-dabiq>.
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nouncement put forward by Da‘esh is almost completely dependent on an 
apocalyptic worldview. This interpretation is formed upon the idea that there 
has been a continuous downslide in society since after the time of the Prophet 
Muhammad and until the present day.36 As a result, Da‘esh militants view 
themselves as the righteous avengers of the honour of Islam, burdened with 
the obligation to purify society by creating a just State. This radical ideology 
was instilled into the roots of Da‘esh and it continues to inform their vision 
of jihād and its obligatory nature. The late Abu Mus‘ab al-Zarqawi warned the 
followers of the consequences of abandoning such a duty:
O nation of Islam, come to the rescue of the jihād in Iraq before the infi-
del majority besieges the mujahidin. O by God, who holds my soul, if the 
torch of jihād is extinguished, if the breath of jihād weakens, and if the 
pockets of jihād in Iraq are closed, the Islamic nation will not rise until 
God wills it to rise. The noose around the entire nation will be tightened 
and humiliation and submission will be forced upon the nation. It will 
then receive God’s punishment. Then our conditions will be an embodi-
ment of what Ibn Kathir said in his book, al-Bidaya wa al-nihaya [The 
Beginning and the End], namely, that when people abandoned jihād they 
were surprised to find the Tatars at their homes. A Tatar woman would 
pass by groups of men. She would tell them: ‘Stop, do not go.’ Then she 
would bring a knife and slay them all, one by one. They never showed any 
resistance. Thus the punishment will be followed by further punishments 
and the disobedience is followed by further disobedience. The punish-
ment will not be lifted unless by full repentance. Repentance means a 
return to your religion, namely, jihād.37
One can see here the central role played by the concept of jihād in the ide-
ology and the military agenda of the movement, quite like in the case of 
Al-Qaeda.38 In the ninth issue of Da‘esh propaganda magazine titled ‘They 
Plot and Allah Plots’, one can thus find the term jihād referred to a total of 57 
36 D. Cook, ‘Fighting to Create the Just State, Apocalypticism in Radical Muslim Discourse’ 
in S.H. Hashmi (ed), Just War, Holy Wars, and Jihāds – Christian, Jewish and Muslim 
Encounters and Exchanges (OUP 2012) 364–382.  
37 Quoted Ibid. 375. 
38 A. Guellali, ‘Understanding the Discourses on Jihad in Islam Through Classical and Mod-
ern Narratives’ in M.C. Bassiouni and A. Guellali (eds), Jihad and Its Challenges to Interna-
tional and Domestic Law (The Hague Academic Press 2010) 81.
45The Self-declared Islamic State (Da‘esh) and Ius ad Bellum
times.39 The same issue illustrates the life-cycle of jihād and the steps to be 
followed by every jihadist joining the group:
One first performs hijrah to the lands of jihād (now, dārul-Islām), then 
gives bay’ah, pledging what it entails of obedience (sam‘ and tā‘ah) to the 
amīr (now, the Khalīfah) and commitment to the jamā‘ah (now, the 
Khilāfah), then trains (i‘dād) for the purpose of jihād, then patiently 
spends months of rībat [defending the frontiers posts], serves count- 
less hours of guard duty (hirāsah), then fights (qitāl) in battles and kills 
(qatl) whom he can from amongst the kāfir enemy, and finally achieves 
shahadah.40
The above quotation exhibits the Da’esh view that religion is almost entirely 
a project of social engineering combined with a rigid obedientialism, thus 
reducing it to a totalitarian system with excessive emphasis on outward 
conformity and a vision of every believer as a soldier.41 Apparently, the syn-
onymous use of jihād with qital (fighting) and qatl (killing), combined with 
explicit use of an archaic lexis is a direct attempt to religiously justify the 
reduction of Islam to military action.42 This group’s ultimate justification of 
waging war is jihād, encapsulated within this is a Muslim’s duty to perform 
hijrah, pledge allegiance to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, guard the frontiers of the 
self-proclaimed IS (ribat) and then kill (qatl) the kafir (infidel) enemy, all of 
which is supplemented by the acknowledgement of achieving Shahadah (the 
basic statement of the Islamic faith). This, according to the Grand Mufti of 
Egypt, ‘directly violates the cornerstones of the Islamic belief system that is 
built upon pillars of guidance not compulsion, moderation not extremism, 
peace not war, gentleness not harshness, love not hate; ease not hardship, 
cooperation not disassociation, brotherhood and sisterhood not enmity.’43 
39 ‘They Plot and Allah Plots’ (Dabiq, issue 9, Sha‘ban 1436) <www.clarionproject.org/news/
islamic-state-isis-isil-propaganda-magazine-dabiq>.
40 Ibid. 13. 
41 C. Dagli, ‘Jihād and the Islamic Law of War’, in Ghazi bin Muhammad et al. (eds), War and 
Peace in Islam: The Uses and Abuses of Jihād (The Royal Islamic Strategic Studies Centre, 
2013) 56–98 at 91.
42 D. Dakake, ‘The Myth of a Militant Islam’ in Ghazi bin Muhammad et al. (eds), Ibid. 
99–131 at 100. 
43 Dr S. Allam/The Grand Mufti of Egypt, ‘The Ideological Battlefield: Egypt’s Dar al-Iftaa 




The Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia in turn declared Da‘esh as ‘the number one 
enemy of Islam’ which also reflects the split between original Wahhabism 
from which Da‘esh draw their inspiration and the reformed Wahhabism of 
today.
 Da‘esh Justifications for Waging War
Da‘esh believe that the ‘world today has been divided into two camps’, and 
that there is ‘no third camp present’.44 To those considering following Da‘esh 
beliefs it appears to leave no choice but to fully engage with their project or 
otherwise be considered the enemy. The two camps are depicted as ‘Islam 
and faith and the camp of the “disbelief” (kufr) and hypocrisy’.45 The self-pro-
claimed IS embodies its struggle to purify Islam as a legitimate act under the 
banner of jihād. The religious claim of legitimacy is the crux of a sustained 
and rallying narrative that has enabled Da‘esh to recruit thousands of fight-
ers to join their ranks. The justifications put forth by Da‘esh for waging war 
against not just the West, but any state, society and individual who objects to 
their primitive interpretation of Islam, span across a three tiered spectrum, 
namely, ideological, political and militant. The ideological and militant justifi-
cations form the foundations to support the political, each providing an indi-
vidual justification yet all equally reliant on each other when conducting an 
analysis of their legitimacy. 
The political justification for waging war forms the ultimate objective 
of Da‘esh narrative; to establish and expand a ‘Caliphate’ (Khilāfa) until the 
parameters of the world fall under the banner of Islam.46 Territorial expan-
sion, in order to extend an Islamic form of governance which strictly abides 
by their distorted version of Shariʿah was the fundamental goal of Da‘esh since 
its inception and remains so today.47 Leaders of this group stipulate that, as a 
definite ruling of Islam, Muslims fall under an obligatory duty to unite in one 
body, appoint a single leader, and obey him, proof of which is in the Shariʿah.48 
As such, Da‘esh believe that the appointment of al-Baghdadi as Caliph and 





48 ‘From the Battle of Al-Ahzab to the War of Coalitions’ (Dabiq, issue 11, Dhul-Qa‘dah 1436) 
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the declaration of a Caliphate is in accordance with the tenets of Islam, mak-
ing territorial expansion a legitimate means for waging war. 
The political becomes intertwined with the ideological in a second justi-
fication put forth by Da‘esh; the expansion of a Caliphate is fundamental 
as Islamic countries such as Iraq and Syria are governed by regimes which 
have fallen into ‘ignorance’ (jahiliyya) and have broken the postulates of the 
Shariʿah. This stems from the Salafi doctrine which stipulates that a State 
should be governed in accordance with ‘God’s oneness’ (tawhid), recognis-
ing ‘God’s sovereignty’ (hakimiyya) as the only legitimate form of governance. 
Da‘esh leaders argue that, as Muslim States have become modernised, corrupt 
and subject to Western influence, they have deviated away from the true path 
of Islam.49 As such, it is the collective duty of Da‘esh to expand the Caliphate 
and revise Islam to reform the jahīli society.50 
Within this ideological context lies the practice of excommunication 
(takfīr), which literally means: ‘declaring somebody – who, in this case, is an 
actual member of the [Muslim] community and passes for a believer – to be a 
Kāfir, and condemning him as such’ and should be lawfully killed.51 As a result, 
the Da‘esh continues to wage war, not just to expand their so-called Caliphate 
and overthrow jahīli governments, but to convert or eradicate non-Muslims as 
well as Muslims within their control who object to their distorted view of the 
correct application of Islam. This ideological justification is further enhanced 
through the Sunni/Shi‘a sectarian divide. Eradicating Shi‘a forms one of the 
major reasons for Da‘esh atrocities. The divide between the Sunni and Shi‘a 
has long been a part of Islamic history. However, in relation to modern times, 
ever since the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, this hatred has spearheaded mili-
tant groups’ narrative for waging war.52 Replacing Saddam Hussein’s Sunni 
majority government with Nouri Al Maliki’s Shi‘a majority acted as a catalyst 
for sectarianism, pushing 85,000 Iraqi civil servants into unemployment and 
demobilising 400,000 Iraqi armed forces. Indeed, the hatred Da‘esh has shown 
towards Shi‘a Muslims has reached genocidal proportions, as their eradication 
becomes a key target in the strategy.53 
49 Ibid. 6. 
50 ‘The Return of the Khilafah’ (n 44) 35.
51 T. Izutsu, The Concept of Belief in Islamic Theology: A Semantic Analysis of Iman and Islam, 
(Yurindo Publishing, 1965) 11. For more on the meaning, conception and practice of Takfīr 
see C. Adang et al. (eds), Accusations of Unbelief in Islam: A Diachronic Perspective on 
Takfīr (Brill 2015). 
52 ‘From the Battle of Al-Ahzab to the War of Coalitions’ (n 48) 16.
53 See Badar, ‘The Road to Genocide’ (n 34) 401–9.
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The militant aspect of Da‘esh declarations of war comes in the form of 
an offensively defensive jihād. The group leaders believe themselves to be 
engaged in a war with Western and Coalition led forces and are responding 
as a matter of self-defence.54 It is significant in this regard to note that notion 
of jihād is influenced by the writings of Taqi al-Din Ahmad Ibn Taymiyya (also 
known as Sheykh al Islam) a prominent Muslim scholar who was born imme-
diately after the fall of the Abbasid Caliphate at the hands of the Mongol 
forces in the year 656 AH/1258 CE. His famous fatwa that applied for the first 
time the concept of jihād as an authorisation to fight the Muslim ruler who 
abandoned Islam through his disbelief and his disregard for Shariʿah has had 
a significant influence on extremist militant groups who have been declaring 
jihād against their governments. Ibn Taymiyyah considered that jihād must 
be waged against all those who stand against the triumph of God’s will on 
earth:‘[s]ince lawful warfare is essentially jihād and since its aim is that reli-
gion is God’s entirely and God’s word is uppermost, therefore according to all 
Muslims, those who stand in the way of this aim must be fought’.55 
This line of reasoning has formed the basis of Da‘esh justification for 
its actions and the claim that this group’s jihād is lawful under Shariʿah.56 
Whether these justifications are grounded in, or supported by, Islamic inter-
national law is the focus of the subsequent sections.
 Islamic International Law (Siyar) 
In the second century of the Islamic era, the term siyar was used by jurists 
to refer to the conduct of the government of the ummah in its relationship 
with other communities.57 In the Sunna, the word siyar is used to refer to the 
military expeditions and missionary journeys sent by the Prophet.58 In the 
54 ‘From the Battle of Al-Ahzab to the War of Coalitions’ (n 48) 46.
55 A. Ibn Taymiyya, al-Siyāsa al-Shar‘iyya fi Islah al-ra‘i wa al-ra‘iyya, (Dar al-Arqam, 1406 AH, 
1986 AD) quoted in R. Peters, Jihad in Classical and Modern Islam: A Reader (2nd edn, 
Markus Wiener Publishers 2009) 44.
56 ‘The Return of the Khilafah’ (n 44) 34. 
57 M. Khadduri (trs), The Islamic Law of Nations: Shaybānī’s Siyar (John Hopkins University 
Press 1966) 39. For the early terminology and usage of the term Siyar see M. Ḥamidullah, 
Muslim Conduct of State (4th edn. Sh. Muhammad Ashraf 1961) 10: ‘ When Islam came and 
founded a State of its own, the earliest name given by Muslim writers to the special 
branch of law dealing with war, peace and neutrality seems to have been Siyar, the plural 
form of Sirat, meaning conduct and behaviour’.
58 A.I. Bouzenita, ‘The Siyar – An Islamic of Nations?’ (2007) 35 Asian Journal of Social Sci-
ence 19, 20; A. Al-Dawoody, The Islamic Law of War: Justifications and Regulations (Palgrave 
McMillan 2011) 109.
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legal context, the word refers to the areas of Islamic international and Islamic 
humanitarian law; thus ‘to the ways and methods followed by the Prophet in 
his dealings with non-Muslim states and individuals in times of peace and 
war’.59 Subsequently, the aim of the jurists expanding on the notion after the 
death of the Prophet was to regulate the conduct of the Islamic State with 
regard to non-Muslim states, in accordance with the rules of the Qur’ān and 
the precedents laid down by the Prophet.60 
At the broadest level, there are foundational differences between inter-
national law and siyar. The former is derived from a mixture of natural law 
and positive law in the form of inter-state treaties and implied agreement, 
while the latter is derived from divine law, documented by the Qur’ān and 
the hadith. However, as Mahdi Zahraa points out siyar ‘is not ab initio repre-
sentative of Islamic law, but rather is a collection of views and opinions that 
should be assessed in the light of the Qur’ān, the Sunna and the contingen-
cies of time and place’.61 The opinions of early Muslim jurists do not repre-
sent a comprehensive theory of international law for the modern age and so 
it has been left to current jurists to develop the teachings of the Qur’ān into a 
workable model. Classical siyar saw the world as essentially divided into dār 
al-Islam (abode of peace) and dār al-harb (abode of war), and in the expan-
sionist era of Islamic history, those within the dār al-Islam did not recognise 
the equality of states residing outside the Muslim ummah.62 The imagery of 
these two abodes soon allowed for ‘the legitimisation of violence against the 
59 Ibid. 109.
60 Ibid. See also M. Khadduri, War and Peace in Islam (The John Hopkins Press 1955) 47; M.T. 
Al Ghunaimi, The Muslim Conception of International Law and the Western Approach 
(Martinus Nijhoff 1968) 96; Khadduri (n 57), 39; N.A. Shah, Islamic Law and the Law of 
Armed Conflict: The Armed Conflict in Pakistan (Routledge 2011) 60-69; R. Moschtaghi, ‘The 
Relations between International Law, Islamic Law and Constitutional Law of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran – A Multilayer System of Conflict?’ (2009) 13 Max Planck Yearbook of 
United Nations Law 375, 392. According to Khadduri (n 57) 19: ‘The classical theory of the 
Islamic law of nations is found neither in the Qur’ān nor in the prophet’s utterances, 
although its basic assumptions were derived from these authoritative sources; it was 
rather the product of Islamic juridical speculation at the height of the Islamic power’.
61 M. Zahraa, ‘Characteristic Features of Islamic Law: Perceptions and Misconceptions’ 
(2000) 15 Arab Law Quarterly 191.
62 Al Ghunaimi (n 60) 155–56 noting that Muslims jurists ‘did not come to agreement about 
what is dar al-Islam and what is dar al-harb… Hanafists, provide that territory must be 
either Muslim or harbi since they do not accept that a given territory may stay outside the 
pale of the Islamic conquest… Al-Shafi’i advocated a third division of the world, viz. dar 
al-sulh, world of peace, or dar al muwad’ah or al’ahd, world of covenant’. 
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others, those who belong to the territory of Harb, of war’.63 The earliest jurists 
from the 7th century, who belonged to the Hanafi school, were of the posi-
tion that non-believers could only be fought if they resorted to armed con-
flict and not simply on account of their disbelief.64 Already in the 8th century, 
however, this changed with the advent of the Syrian School of thought which 
reflected the reality of Syrian Umayyads fighting with Byzantines.65 They saw 
aggressive war to overcome the dār al-harb not merely as permissible but as ‘a 
moral obligation … for those capable of assuming it, namely able-bodied and 
financially secure adult males’.66 
It is important to understand, however, that the division between the two 
abodes is not as simple as equating dār al-Islam with Muslim territory and dār 
al-harb with the territory under the control of the unbelievers. According to 
Abu Hanifa, even non-Muslim territory can be part of dār al-Islam as long as 
a truce has been concluded with the Muslims and tribute is paid to them for 
protection.67 On the other hand, Muslim territory can be transformed into dār 
al-harb if the state applies the law of non-Muslims or the security of Muslims 
and the protected people among the non-Muslims ‘the dhimmah – people of 
the book’ is compromised.68 Abu Yusuf and al-Shaybānī, both followers of the 
Hanafī school, reassert the first condition as sufficient to transform dār al-
Islam into a dār al-harb.69 In other words, if Muslim territory ‘applied the law 
of unbelievers it will become a territory of unbelief even if most of the inhab-
itants are Muslims’.70 Furthermore, even if Islamic law is applied in Muslim 
territory, but those governing it are non-Muslims, it will remain a dār al-harb, 
according to other jurists from the Hanafī school, as the power should be in 
the hands of Muslims.71 
63 Guellali (n 38) 71.
64 A. Afsaruddin, ‘Views of Jihad throughout History’, (2007) 1 Religion Compass 165, 167.
65 Ibid.
66 S.H. Hashmi, ‘Jihad’ in R. Wuthnow (ed), Encyclopedia of Politics and Religion (Routledge 
1998) 425–26.  
67 Afsaruddin (n 64).
68 A. Bakr Al-Kāssānī, Badāi‘ al-Sanai‘ fi Tarteeb al-Sharāi‘ (vol. 7 Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyya, 
1406 AH) 130; M. Al-Butī, al-jihād fi al-Islām (Dār al-Fikr, 1412 AH, 1991 AD) 198; R. Peters, 
Islam and Colonialism, The Doctrine of Jihad in Modern History (Mouton Publisher 1979) 
12; M.K. Haykal, al Jihād wa al-Qitāl fi al-Siyāsa al-Shar‘iyya (vol. 1 Dār al-Bayāriq, 1414 AH, 
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69 Haykal, Ibid. 662; Peters, Ibid, 12. 
70 Haykal (n 68) 662; Peters (n 68)12.
71 Ibid. 
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Al-Shafi‘ī added to the two abodes a third division of the world, i.e. dār al-
sulh, world of peace, or dār al muwad‘ah or al‘ahd, abode of covenant.72 By 
doing so, he no longer allowed for the option of non-Muslim territory to be 
considered as dār al-Islam. Those who entered a treaty with the Muslims and 
paid tribute to them, were now considered to fall under this third abode of 
temporary peace. It was not until the 12th century that dār al-Islam was again 
perceived more broadly, to include non-Muslim territory where Muslims were 
free to practice their religion.73 In the same way as the original Wahhabis 
before them, Da’esh however, considers only lands under its control as dār 
al-Islam. Both ideologies encourage hijra to said lands and then command 
the expansion of their rule unlimited by geographical borders with the rules 
being imam to all Muslims in contrast to the reformed Wahhabism which 
rejects the idea of Caliphate and expansive jihād.74 
It is important to note, that the Islamic world has not refused to integrate 
into the modern international law system in more recent history. All Muslim 
majority States are members of the United Nations and all are signatories of 
the Geneva Conventions. As noted by Javaid Rehman, they all ‘have accepted 
the provisions of Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter. There is also a 
renunciation of violence, aggression and terrorism. They have adopted this 
position without renouncing their Islamic credentials’.75 Thus siyar had 
evolved to allow for permanent non-violent legal contact with non-Muslim 
political entities in the form of treaty-making and diplomacy. This evolution 
is perceived by Da‘esh as the corrupt modernisation of Islam. However, such 
development did not merely arise out of political and economic necessity, 
but is arguably a more authentic siyar, one which is closer to the teachings of 
the Qur’ān and the Sunna, than the concept of dividing the world into dār al-
Islam and dār al-harb. 
When it comes to ius ad bellum, we can distinguish two paths which siyar 
has taken. The first one refers to the right to a defensive jihād. In this sense, 
the concepts embodied in the siyar have presented a continuum from the 
days of the Prophet until today, when it is still regularly invoked, especially 
in the relationships between Muslim states.76 A similar continuity can be 
72 Al Ghunaimi (n 60) 155–56. 
73 Afsaruddin (n 64) 167–8.
74 B. Al-Ibrahim, ‘ISIS, Wahhabism and Takfir’ (2015) 8 Contemporary Arab Affairs 408, 412.
75 J. Rehman, Islamic State Practices, International Law and the Threat from Terrorism: A Cri-
tique of the ‘Clash of Civilizations’ in the New World Order (Hart Publishing 2005) 60. 
76 S.H. Hashmi, ‘Jihād and the Geneva Conventions: the Impact of International Law on 
Islamic Theory’ in S.H. Hashmi (ed), Just War, Holy Wars, and Jihāds – Christian, Jewish 
and Muslim Encounters and Exchanges (OUP 2012) 332.  
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found in terms of ius in bello, i.e. Islamic humanitarian law. It is only in the 
sense of offensive war, that siyar had diverted from the strict teachings of the 
Qur’ān and Sunna in the centuries after the death of the Prophet, and has only 
recently been rightly reformed to fit with Islam’s original message, as well as 
the modern international status quo. As mentioned previously, groups such 
as Da‘esh, refuse this reformation and prefer to stick to the aggressive version. 
In this sense they mirror the Ikhwan man ta’a Allah, a radical group created 
by Ibn Saud, the founder of the modern state of Saudi Arabia. Ibn Saud used 
their fanaticism for the conquests of his rivals in the region, i.e. the Rashids 
backed by the Turks and the Sharifs of Hejaz, however when he wished to 
discontinue expansive jihād to adhere to the international order, the Ikhwan 
refused to abandon the original Wahhabi ideology which he himself had 
taught them and which declared all non-Wahhabi Muslims as infidels.77 They 
thus declared him a traitor and continued with invasions against his wishes 
until he crushed them at the battle of Sibilla.78 
Muslim religious concepts have undergone a similar process in the cryst-
allisation of what is ius ad bellum as had taken place in the ‘western’ domes-
tic and international law. This is despite the fact that secularism, which has 
played an important role in the latter, has never fully established itself in 
Muslim majority countries. The doctrine of ‘just war’, in itself a pre-Chris-
tian concept which was adapted in medieval Christian thought through the 
theological exercises of Aquinas and Augustine, constitutes one of the most 
important influences of the Christian religion on international ius ad bellum 
in how it severely restricted the reasons to go to war.79 At the same time, holy 
war with concepts such as the right to fight heretics and infidels to spread the 
faith, or the condemnation of treaties with Muslims, motivated by the desire 
to unite the Christian world under papal authority, also formed part of the 
Christian approach to war and it took secularisation, started by Gentili and 
Grotius and subsequently continued by writers like de Vattel, to discard it in 
their ‘just war’ theories.80 
Given the fact that many in Muslim majority countries still sceptically 
look upon secularism and that Muslims will always put God’s law first, it is 
77 Al-Ibrahim (n 74) 409.
78 Ibid. 
79 A. von Ungern-Sternberg, ‘Religion and Religious Intervention’ in B. Fassbender and 
A. Peters (eds), The Oxford Handbook of The History of International Law (OUP 2012) 302.
80 Ibid. 301, 303–304; See also Al-Dawoody (n 58) 109; Ḥammīdullāh (n 57) 3; Khadduri (n 60) 
47; Al Ghunaimi (n 60) 96; Khadduri (n 57) 39; Shah (n 60) 60–69; Moschtaghi (n 60) 392; 
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important to acknowledge the identity between international law norms and 
modern siyar on the matter of ius ad bellum if we are to expect lasting peace 
between Muslim and other nations, and groups.
 Illegitimate Use of Force for Establishing a Caliphate? 
According to classical Sunni doctrine, the universality of the Caliphate is the 
only religiously supported political form available to the Muslim world, and 
revolution against it is condemned.81 However in the 10th and 11th centuries 
CE, the economic basis of the Islamic Caliphate began to erode and regional 
powers started to exercise virtually autonomous control over limited areas of 
the central Caliphate’s domain.82 When they began to declare independence, 
the Sunni doctrine saw these claims as tantamount to heresy.83 However 
the trend toward decentralisation continued and was further reinforced by 
the Crusades and the Mongol invasions.84 In the 15th and 16th centuries the 
Islamic world fell under Ottoman Turkish control and in their desire to once 
again encourage unity, the scholars gave the Ottoman ruler religious legitima-
tion as the Caliph.85 However, after the fall of the Ottoman Empire, the region 
came under effective European control which eventually brought about the 
various nation-States of today. In the latter half of the 20thcentury the region 
has thus witnessed a struggle for independence, which as Tamara Sonn 
explains is: 
in one sense, a part of the struggle of Muslims to be free from foreign 
domination that began in the thirteenth century. In another sense, the 
struggle is to come to grips with the historical phenomenon of decentral-
ization in the Islamic world… [G]overnments… are struggling to establish 
their legitimacy within the context of a religious tradition that still 
 conceives of politics in terms of the ideal of a universal Islamic state. The 
conflict is between social and economic realities that favour 
nation-states and a religious tradition that thinks of a single, centralised 
81 T. Sonn, ‘Irregular Warfare and Terrorism in Islam: Asking the Right Questions’ in J.T. John-
son and J. Kelsay (eds), Cross, Crescent and Sword: The Justification and Limitation of War 
in Western Islamic Tradition (Greenwood Press 1990) 133–134. For more on the Islamic con-
ception of ‘state’, ‘ummah’, ‘jama‘a’, ‘dawlah’ see Al Ghunaimi (n 60) 61–70. For more on 
the rise and fall of the Islamic Caliphate see N. Ardiç, Islam and Politics of Secularism: The 
Caliphate and Middle Eastern Modernization in the Early 20th Century (Routledge 2012). 





govern ment for the entire region… These difficulties weaken the claims 
of existing governments to Islamic legitimacy; this invites criticism of the 
governments, which in turn breeds repressive responses.86
As mentioned, according to classical Sunni doctrine, there can be only one 
source of political legitimacy: religion, and since the latter is considered uni-
versal, there could only be one legitimate political power, namely the uni-
versal Caliphate, revolution against which is condemned.87 Other territorial 
rulers were accepted, as long as they were recognised by the Caliph, even if 
the relation was purely formal, in which case, according to al-Mawardi, even 
a usurper had to be obeyed, so long as he formally recognised the authority of 
the Caliph.88 
According to siyar, the declaration of war is generally entrusted to the high-
est responsible authority in the State, the Imam, and the ummah (Muslim 
community) has to obey him. This applies in situations of collective jihād but 
when jihād is a personal duty, the foundation of Imām is not a sine qua non 
for the declaration of jihād.89 There is also a consensus among the majority of 
Muslim jurists that ‘Islam does not permit recourse to violence that disturbs 
peace and order in society even if it be against a government of questionable 
legitimacy so long as that government stays short of blatant indulgence in 
criminality and kufr (denial and rejection of Islam)’.90 In light of this, Da‘esh 
jihādi rhetoric firstly declares that Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, as appointed Caliph 
(Khalīfah) is legitimate and as such, possesses authority over Muslims world-
wide and the ability to declare war. In addition, extreme emphasis is placed 
on Muslims’ duty to submit to the so-called Caliphate. According to the Da‘esh 
propaganda magazine: ‘[t]he Islamic State actively works to educate its citi-
zens, preach to and admonish them, enforce their strict adherence to Islamic 
obligations […] eradicate all traces of shirk and heresy, incite the people to 
jihād and call them to unite behind the Khalīfah.’91 It is in the propaganda of 
radical groups that we find the complex relationship between the notion of a 




89 Ibn Qudāma al-Maqdasi, al-Mughnī, (vol.8 Maktabat al-Qahira 1969) 352; ‘Alī ibn Muham-
mad Al-Māwardī, al-Ahkām al-Sultāniyya (Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyya, 1405 AH, 1985 AD) 5.
90 M.H. Kamali, ‘Jihād and the Interpretation of the Quran: Contextualising Islamic Tradi-
tion’ in Bassiouni and Guellali (n 38), 57. 
91 ‘A Call to Hijrah’, (Dabiq, issue 3, Shawwal 1435 AH) 17 <www.clarionproject.org/news/
islamic-state-isis-isil-propaganda-magazine-dabiq>.
55The Self-declared Islamic State (Da‘esh) and Ius ad Bellum
zine, Dabiq, displays this while outlining the ‘route to the Caliphate’. The five 
steps to Caliphate include: hijrah (emigration), jama’ah (congregation), desta-
bilise taghut (idolatry), tamkin (consolidation), and khilafah (caliphate) as 
seen in the figure below.92
The plan is not only informative but demonstrates how Da‘esh uses theoreti-
cal propaganda to justify its military action and therefore its superiority over 
other armed groups. The legitimacy of establishing a Caliphate hangs on the 
ability to produce military victory through jihād and consolidation of suc-
cess, as proof of Allah’s approval. Understanding this ratio is key to under-
standing both the practical and emotional relationship between jihād and the 
Caliphate. Indeed Da‘esh has gone as far as to undermine and criticise other 
radical groups, including Al-Qa‘eda, who have failed in the overall and over-
arching Islamic duty to establish a Caliphate.93Da‘esh represents a zero sum 
ideology; either you are with this group in the establishment of an Islamic 
Caliphate or you are an infidel. Indeed by failing to adopt the radical ideol-
ogy as propounded by Da‘esh any leader of a Muslim-majority country is iden-
tified as deviant, and thus open to attack.94 However, by refusing to interact 
with any organisations that it considers impure, Da‘esh has ensured that the 
only option available to them is one of military force, as diplomacy and work-
ing for mutual advantage is no longer an option. 
92 H.K. Gamnhir, ‘Dabiq: The Strategic Messaging of the Islamic State’ (Institute for the Study 





However, the authenticity of al-Baghdadi’s claim as the rightful Caliph 
of a legitimate self-proclaimed caliphate is fundamentally flawed. A letter 
addressed to al-Baghdadi, composed and signed by over a 100 leading Muslim 
scholars, identifies the illegitimacy of his self-declared ‘Caliph’ status and as 
such, his authority to wage jihād: 
There is agreement (ittifaq) among scholars that a caliphate is an obliga-
tion upon the Ummah. A new caliphate requires consensus from all 
Muslims. Omar ibn Al-Khattab said: ‘Whosoever pledges allegiance to a 
man without due consultation with Muslims has fooled himself; and nei-
ther he nor the man to whom he pledged allegiance should be followed 
for he has risked both their lives. In your speech, you quoted the 
Companion Abu Bakr Al-Siddiq: ‘I have been given authority over you, 
and I am not the best of you.’ This begs the question: who gave you 
authority over the ummah? Was it your group? If this is the case, then a 
group of no more than several thousand has appointed itself the ruler of 
over a 1.6 billion Muslims. This attitude is based upon a corrupt circular 
logic that says: ‘Only we are Muslims, and we decide who the caliph is, we 
have chosen one and so whoever does not accept our caliph is not a 
Muslim.’ In this case, a caliph is nothing more than the leader of a certain 
group that declares more than 99 per cent of Muslims non-Muslim. Thus, 
you face one of two conclusions: either you concur that they are Muslims 
and they did not appoint you caliph over them – in which case you are 
not the caliph – or, the other conclusion is that you do not accept them as 
Muslims, in which case Muslims are a small group not in need of a caliph, 
so why use the word ‘caliph’ at all? In truth, the caliphate must emerge 
from a consensus of Muslim countries, organizations of Islamic scholars 
and Muslims across the globe.95
Thus, the formation of a new Caliphate requires consensus from all Muslim 
countries, organisations of Islamic scholars and Muslims across the globe.96 
This counterargument ultimately refutes the Da‘esh claim to wage a global 
jihād in order to expand the Caliphate because the Caliphate itself has been 
illegitimately created. Islam rejects the postulate that ‘the ends justify the 
95 ‘Open Letter to Dr. Ibrahim Awwad Al-Badri, Alias “Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi” and to the 
Fighters and Followers of the Self-Declared “Islamic State”’ (19 September 2014) <www.
lettertobaghdadi.com/pdf/Booklet-English.pdf>.
96 Ibid. 27. 
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means’97 requiring that both the ends and the means conform to its values 
and principles and to its specific legal dictates. Therefore, violent conduct 
towards Muslim and non-Muslim civilians in order to achieve such a goal 
runs contrary to the very tenets of Islam. However, hypothetically speaking, if 
the Caliphate were legitimate, this, according to the majority of classical doc-
trine of jihād, would permit waging war in the name of territorial expansion. 
Moreover, the jurists of this period were of the view that Shariʿah required the 
head of state to organise yearly raids into enemy territory.98 These interpreta-
tions however have no basis in the Qur’ān or the Sunnah. Rather, much like 
the division of the world into dār al-Islam and dār al-harb, such ideas were 
based on ad hoc juristic interpretations of particularly the verses 9:5 and 9:29, 
in search of justifications of the realpolitik of the time and as such are not 
doctrinally binding in any way.99 
 Da‘esh and the Khārijites Conception of Jihād 
The barbaric actions of Da‘esh may in fact be viewed as nothing more than 
history repeating itself. The characteristics of Da‘esh and its conception of 
jihād bears a strong resemblance to those of the al-Muhakkimah, the first sect 
of the Khārijites. Due to the actions of this group and its fanaticism that sheds 
the blood of thousands of Muslims, the majority of Muslim scholars have 
specified them as Khārijites or Khawārij as meaning everyone who separated 
from the Muslim ummah.100 The term Khārijite is also known as khawārij or 
khārijī, and is derived from the verb kharaja meaning ‘to come out, to exit.’ 
During the period of the fourth Caliph (656-661 CE), which coincided with 
the first Muslim civil war, Caliph ‘Ali felt obliged to accept arbitration during 
the battle of Siffin.101 Al-Muhakkimah, who were considered to be among ‘Ali’s 
followers regarded all those who admitted the authority of human decision 
97 M.C. Bassiouni, ‘Misunderstanding Islam on the Use of Violence’ (2015) 37 Houston Jour-
nal of International Law 648. 
98 Peters (n 55) 112.
99 Afsaruddin (n 64) 167.
100 I. Goldhizer, Introduction to Islamic Theology and Law (Princeton University Press 1981) 
1781. For further information on the Khārijites see J.T. Kenney, Muslim Rebels: Khārijites 
and the Politics of Extremism in Egypt (OUP 2006) 21; Izutsu (n 51) 1–16 discussing the 
Khārijites concept of takfīr; W.M. Watt, The Formative Period of Islamic Thought, (One-
world Publications 1998); A.K. Kazi and J.G. Flynn (trs), Mohammad b. ‘Abd al-Karim 
Shahrastini, Muslim Sects and Divisions (Kegan Paul International 1984); K.C. Seelye (trs), 
Abu-Mansur ‘abd-al-Kahir ibn-Tahir al-Baghdadi, Moslem Schisms and Sects (Columbia 
University Press 1920). 
101 Allam (n 43) 119–127.
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(hukm), in the present case, ‘Ali and the two arbiters, as downright infidels.102 
They claimed that there was no decision but God’s (la hukm illā lillāh), which 
is based on the Quranic verse 5:47: ‘Whoever does not judge by that which 
God has revealed, such surely are infidels’. Rebelling against ‘Ali they declared 
him an unbeliever, accusing him of compromising God’s sovereignty by judg-
ing on matters in which God is the only judge.103 It was arguably this decision 
that was the most prominent in the rise of the Khārijites.
The primary motivation of the Khārijites was to secure the kingdom of God 
on earth and as such, whoever did not rule in accordance with the rule of God 
was considered an infidel and was not to be obeyed. To achieve their goal they 
began exhibiting extremist tendencies, introducing acts of martyrdom and 
violent attacks against those Muslims who did not agree with their views.104 
The latter were deemed as unbelievers and the Khārijites believed that jihād 
against them was obligatory by whatever means suitable, no matter how 
extreme.105 Contrary to the mainstream Sunni doctrine, IS argued that right 
belief was insufficient as a criterion to distinguish Muslims from non-Mus-
lims and that right action was also required.106 In the same vein, the Khārijites 
believed that ‘anyone who claimed to be a Muslim but committed forbidden 
acts forfeited that claim’ and ‘such a person could never re-enter Islam and 
should thus be killed along with his immediate family’.107 Through their focus 
on the Qur’ān and what they believed was the intention of the word of Allah 
they became assured of their own religious purity and set about creating an 
ideal community of the saved.108
The Khārijites, just like Da‘esh, believed that jihād was a fundamental arti-
cle of the Muslim faith and the sixth pillar of the Islamic religion.109 Jihād is 
to be waged against those who did not accept their view of Islam, Muslims as 
well as non-Muslims. Muslim scholar Ibn Taymiya explained that they consid-
ered only their land as the dār al-Islam (abode of Islam/abode of peace) and 
all other land, including that of all other Muslims as the dār al-hārb (abode 
of war). As a result of this, they regarded wasting Muslim lives and seizing 
102 Izutsu (n 51) 5.
103 M.F. bin Mohd Sharif, ‘Baghy in Islamic Law and the Thinking of Ibn Taymiyya’ (2006) 20 
Arab Law Quarterly 289, 301. 
104 Kenney (n 100) 34–35.
105 J. Kelsay, Arguing the Just War in Islam (Harvard University Press 2007) 119–120.
106 Sonn (n 81) 136.
107 Ibid. 
108 Kenney (n 100) 4; Sonn (n 81) 136.
109 Khadduri (n 60) 68; Al Ghunaimi (n 60) 141. 
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their wealth as lawful.110 This is thought to be the first time in Islamic his-
tory in which an innovation (bid‘a) which deviated from Islamic teaching (i.e. 
practicing takfīr against fellow Muslims) had been made.111 This deviation 
however, is one of the fundamental principles followed by Da‘esh. 
Muslim jurists suggest that the main characteristic, which led the Khārijites 
to sway from the path of Islam, was the superficial understanding of the 
Qur’ān and the Sunna.112 Caliph ‘Ali also alluded to the intentional nature of 
their misinterpretations during the exchange between them in which they 
used the Qur’ānic expression ‘lā hukm illā li-llāh’ when protesting against him. 
To this he replied, ‘a word of truth in which falsehood was intended’. These 
same characteristics apply to many of the followers of Da‘esh. 
Thus, the Khārijites set a dangerous precedent; rejecting the validity of a 
Muslim’s belief in Islam because one does not adhere to the strict literalist 
interpretation which they themselves viewed as correct. This forms nothing 
short of a baseless justification to engage in violent jihād against the innocent 
and is an act which is orchestrated by many radical terror groups including 
Da‘esh. Their view reflects that of the Khārijites in that the land of Islam had 
become a land of non-Muslims so all those who live in it are infidels and as 
a consequence their killings and the confiscation of their wealth is lawful.113 
A member of the Khārijites who quit the group was considered an apostate 
and was condemned to death. Unsurprisingly the same view is held by Da‘esh. 
In the propaganda magazine of Da‘esh we read: ‘As such, anyone who rebels 
against its [the Caliphate] authority inside its territory is considered a rene-
gade, and it is permissible to fight him after establishing the hujjah against 
him (i.e. clarifying his error to him with proof)’.114
According to the Grand Mufti of Egypt, the shedding of the blood of inno-
cent people by the Da‘esh; the brutal slaughter of women and children and 
challenging the authority of the state; the attacks on mosques, and labelling 
these atrocities jihād are all a continuation of the Khārijites doctrine and ide-
ology.115 Since then Da‘esh has been described as the modern-age Khārijites.116 
In response, Da‘esh however dedicated almost one third of the second issue 
110 A Ibn Taymiya, Fatawa Ibn Taymiya (vol.19 Maktabat al Ma‘arif n.d.) 73.
111 Ibid.
112 Allam (n 43) 119–27.
113 Al Ghunaimi (n 60) 141.
114 Dabiq, ‘The Return of Khilafa’ (n 44) 27.
115 Allam (n 43) 130.
116 A. Mamouri, ‘Who are the Kharijites and What do they have to do with IS?’ Al-Monitor: 
The Pulse of the Middle East (8 January 2015) <www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/ 
01/islamic-state-kjarijites-continuation.html>.
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of its propaganda magazine, Dabiq, to refute a claim of the same kind made 
against the group by the leader of the Jawlānī Front in 2014.117 The rebuttal by 
Da‘esh was not substantiated with arguments but was solely based on calling 
the leadership of the Jawlānī Front to participate in a mubāhalah (supplicat-
ing Allah for his curse to be upon the deceitful party) together with Da‘esh 
spokesman al-‘Adnānī.118 
 Dissecting the Ideology of Da‘esh: The Jihādī-Salafism Movement
The following sections will discuss in brief the Salafist ideology and in partic-
ular the jihādī-Salafist movement to draw potential parallels with Da‘esh ide-
ology on jihād. 
 Salafism 
The term Salafism derives from the expression al-salaf al-salih (the pious 
ancestors) and is a form of Islamic revivalism.119 A distinctive Salafī intellec-
tual genealogy extends to medieval times; the writings of the Syrian Hanbali 
scholar Ibn Taymiyya (d.1328) and his students provide the core theological 
corpus.120 Taymiyya described following the way of the Salaf as interpreting 
‘literally the Qur’ānic verses and hadiths that relate to the Divine attributes, 
and without indicating modality and without attributing to him anthropo-
morphic qualities’.121 The Salafist dimension can be found in Da‘esh theology 
in their belief that the manner in which they practice Islam is more puri-
tan and rigorous than that of other Muslims, so much so in fact, that their 
view is the only authentic interpretation of the religion. As is the case for all 
Muslims, the fundamental component running through the belief of Salafism 
117 Dabiq, ‘The Flood’ (n 35) 20–30.
118 Ibid. Another attempt to refute such claim is found in ‘A Call to Hijra’ (Dabiq, issue 3, 
Shawal 1435) 10-11 <www.clarionproject.org/news/islamic-state-isis-isil-propaganda-mag 
azine-dabiq>.
119 T. Hegghammer, ‘Jihadi Salafis or Revolutionaries? On Theology and Politics in the Study 
of Militant Islamism’ in R. Meijer (eds), Global Salafism: Islam’s New Religious Movement 
(Columbia University Press 2009) 244–266.
120 C. Bunzel, ‘From Paper State to Caliphate: The Ideology of the Islamic State’, The Brook-
ings Project on U.S Relations with the Islamic World, No.19 (2015) 8.
121 W. Shepard, ‘Salafi Islam: The Study of Contemporary Religious-Political Movements’ in 
C. Bennet (eds.), The Bloomsbury Companion To Islamic Studies (Clinton Bennet and Con-
tributors 2013) 163–184, 165.
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is the doctrine of God’s oneness (tawhid).122 Salafīs principally criticise other 
Muslims for corrupting the faith with beliefs and practices that they see as 
denying tawhid. The idea that most Muslims despite professing tawhid do not 
follow or even understand it can be found in the following words of Mohamad 
bin Abdel Wahhab, the founder of original Wahhabism:
During [my time as a student of religion] I did not know the meaning of 
la ilah illa Allah; neither did I know the meaning of Islam. This was also 
true of my teachers; no man among them knew what this meant. If any of 
Al-‘Aridh’s ulema [Riyadh and its surroundings, also known as Al-Yama-
mah region] claims that he knew what la ilah illa Allah meant, or knew 
the meaning of Islam before this time, or claimed that one of his teachers 
knew what it meant, he, then, had lied, fabricated and given credit where 
credit wasn’t due.123
In this sense Wahhabism presented itself as a correction to widespread jahi-
lyyah (ignorance) declaring anyone who did not follow it as infidel, including 
the Hanbali jurists.124
Salafīs believe that true Islam is found in the teachings and understanding 
of religious texts provided in the words and deeds of the first three genera-
tions of Islam, namely the sahabah, al-tabi‘un and tabi‘ al-tabi‘un.’.125 Any kind 
of innovation in behaviour (bid‘a), be it celebrating the birth of the Prophet 
Muhammad, commiserating the death of a saint, or applying tenets of democ-
racy, is in their view unacceptable to God and dangerous to the Islamic faith.
The fundamental tenets which are central to Salafism and thus, lay at the 
core of Da‘esh ideology are ‘the call to return to the authentic practices and 
beliefs of the first generation of Muslims (al-salaf al-salih); the need to dimin-
ish unbelief; the belief that the Qur’ān and Sunna are the only valid sources of 
religious authority; the imperative to rid Islam of heretical innovations (bid‘a); 
122 B. Haykel, ‘On the Nature of Salafi Thought and Action’ in R. Meijer (eds.), Global Salaf-
ism: Islam’s new Religious Movement (Hurst & Company 2009) 38–39; N. Shama, ‘Al-Jama 
‘Al-Islamiya And The Al-Jihad Group in Egypt’ in J.L. Esposito and E. El-Din Shahin (eds), 
The Oxford Handbook of Islam and Politics (OUP 2013) 608. 
123 Bin Qasim, Sheikh Abdurrahman, (ed.), Ad’durar As’samiyah fi Al-Ajwibah An’najdiyah 
[The Shining Pearls in the Najdi Answers], vol. 10, (Alqassem Publishers 1996) cited in 
Bader Al-Ibrahim, (n 74) 413.
124 Bader Al-Ibrahim, (n 74) 413.
125 Bernard Haykel, ‘ISIS: A. Primer’ (Princeton Alumni Weekly 3 June 2015) 4 <www.paw.
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and the belief that specific answers to all conceivable questions are found in 
the Qur’ān and Sunna’.126
Salafism evolved further as it progressed into the twentieth century, 
becoming the Islamist-Salafism represented by the thought of the Muslim 
Brotherhood. This saw the goals of Modern-Salafiya descend from an intellec-
tual level to one that can be disseminated among the people by way of da‘wah 
(preaching/invitation to Islam).127 It is important to note that the Islamist-
Salafist movement as well as the modernist-Salafiya movement did not 
preach or advocate armed violence. However when this school of thought is 
combined with the school of jihād, the military dimension becomes essential.128 
 The Jihādī-Salafism Movement 
The core tenets of the jihādī-Salafism movement are composed of Wahhabi-
inspired Sunni fundamentalism ‘combined with a revolutionary program 
of overthrowing un-Islamic regimes in the Muslim world, as well as irreden-
tism aiming at expelling non-Muslim military presence and inﬂuences from 
Muslim lands’.129 Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, one of the most influential liv-
ing jihādī theorists and the key contemporary ideologue in the jihādī intel-
lectual sphere, defines the movement as ‘a current which unites the call to 
monotheism in all its aspects with jihad for that purpose at the same time’.130 
Whilst both non-violent Salafism and jīhadī-Salafism strictly adhere to abso-
lute monotheism, it is through the exclusive utilisation of militant jīhād as 
a manhaj [methodology] to establish an al-dawlatuh al-Islāmiyyah [Islamic 
126 Shama (n 122) 608.
127 P. Shinar and W. Ende, ‘Salafiyya’ in P. Bearman et al. Encyclopaedia of Islam (2nd edn, 
Brill 2010).
128 Ibid.
129 P. Nesser, ‘Abū Qatāda and Palestine’ (2013) 53 Welt des Islams 416, 417; Q. Wiktorowicz, 
‘The New Global Threat: Transnational Salafıs̄ and Jihad’ (2001) 8 Middle East Policy 18–38; 
Q. Wiktorowicz, ‘Anatomy of the Salaﬁ Movement’ (2006) 29 Studies in Conﬂict and Ter-
rorism 207; A. Moghadam, ‘The Salaﬁ-Jihad as a Religious Ideology’ (Combating Terrorism 
Centre at West Point February 2008) 14–17. <www.ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/ 
2010/06/Vol1Iss3-Art5.pdf>; J. Wagemakers, A Quietist Jihadi: The Ideology and Inﬂuence of 
Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi (CUP 2012).
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state] in accordance with absolute monotheism, which places the latter at the 
top of the extremist hierarchy.131
Adamant in the call for the revival of the authentic Muslim society, the 
objective of the jīhadī-Salafist movement is composed of two tiers; religious 
and political. This involves eliminating shirk through violent jihād in order to 
restore the deviation from the correct path delineated in the Holy Scriptures.132 
The pivotal crux which distinguishes the non-violent Salafis from the radical 
jīhadī-Salafist movement derives from their approach to the question of the 
exercise of God’s sovereignty. The notion that ruling by other than God’s laws 
or replacing the Shariʿah with secular laws falls under the banner of major 
unbelief is fundamental to the latter while moderate Salafis believe that rul-
ing by other than God’s laws is only minor unbelief, preventing the permis-
sibility of making a declaration of takfīr. Thus, Salafi-jihādīs interpret any 
attempt by political rulers to trade away the Shariʿah for secular laws or to 
govern by democracy as an act of profanity and polytheism, in other words, 
major unbelief.
Thus, the adherents of the jihādī-Salafist movement transform their reli-
gious philosophy into jihād through the radical interpretation of the doctrine 
of takfīr. This interpretation creates an obligatory duty to declare takfīr upon 
those who have deviated from ruling in accordance with God’s sovereignty 
and have instead disregarded God’s laws (tabdıl̄ shara’ Allāh) by conferring 
upon themselves the authority to make taḥlıl̄ and taḥrım̄ (declaring some-
thing to be either permissible or impermissible in a way that contradicts the 
divine legislations of God).133 The consequence of usurping the divine attri-
bute of God ‘the legislator’ (al-Hākim) for themselves, sees them categorised 
as inﬁdels, apostates (murtaddūn) and an object that is worshipped, followed 
and obeyed as a partner beside God ṭāghūt (plural: ṭawāghıt̄).134 Muslims are 
consequently obliged to disbelieve in the political regimes ruling with secu-
lar laws, show an open display of enmity, disavowal and hatred before waging 
131 S. Lacroix, ‘Between Revolution and Apoliticism: Nasir al-Din al-Albani and his Impact on 
the Shaping of Contemporary Salaﬁsm’ in R. Meijer (ed), Global Salaﬁsm: Islam’s New Reli-
gious Movement (Columbia University Press 2009) 58–80; J. Olidort, ‘The Politics of “Quie-
tist” Salaﬁsm’, The Brookings Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World (February 
2015) <www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Brookings-Analysis-Paper_Ja 
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jihād against the regimes and its supporters – all of which are considered fun-
damental criteria for the validity of their testimony of faith.135 
The underling theological characteristics common amongst many of the 
contemporary radical movements are bound together by the jīhadī-Sala-
fism creed and are built upon a radical interpretation of the takfīri doctrine. 
However, it is the extremity with which Da‘esh declares the infidelity of 
Muslims and non-Muslims which distinguishes this group from other radical 
organisations, such as Al-Qaeda. Through a totalitarian and relentless adher-
ence to declare takfīr, the puritanical methodology of Da‘esh has led to the 
supposedly permissible killing of thousands of civilians under the banner of 
jihād. 
 Jihād and Resort to War in the Eyes of Islamic International Law
The doctrine of jihād has been viewed as one of the most misinterpreted and 
extremely complex terms in the history of Islamic legal discourse.136 Today, 
the notion of jihād often provides little more than a carte-blanche justification 
for going to war for reasons of realpolitik.137 The rise of ideological extrem-
ism in the Muslim world and the constant media attention have distorted the 
notion of jihād in such a manner that it has led to the misconception that the 
doctrine provides a justification to engage in barbaric war. In fact, this is a 
monstrous betrayal of its true Islamic roots. Da‘esh has taken an iconic, emo-
tive, Islamic term and used it as its call to arms, transforming jihād into a revo-
lutionary murderous doctrine, painted over with a broad brush of theological 
colour to give it the appearance of legitimacy.138 The predominant aim of this 
section is to undermine the inaccurate interpretation of jihād explicitly used 
by Da‘esh to justify the war they wage against their enemies. 
In order to refute the religious justifications implemented by Da‘esh one 
must analyse the meaning of jihād, paying specific attention to its theological 
135 Kassim (n 133) 185. 
136 For a comprehensive work that represents the juristic genre of ikhtilāf (disagreement) 
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evolution namely the three stages of military jihād, in order to understand 
its correct application. However, in this discussion, the notion of jihād must 
not be analysed in isolation, for alongside its own development, the concept 
of ‘just war’ in international law was also adjusted. Indeed, until the 20th 
Century, the right to war was an accepted right and privilege of all States. 
It was not until 1928, when the total devastation of the First World War had 
shaken the world that attempts to curb that right emerged, through the 
Kellogg Briand Pact.139 Over the 21st Century numerous successive attempts at 
regulating war have paved the way for what is prescribed by modern interna-
tional law, however they have not been universally effective. The Nuremburg 
Principles were followed by the United Nations Charter which attempted to 
bind the signatories to a set of protocols making aggressive use of force illegal. 
International treaties have further prohibited war crimes or the acquisition 
of land by force and they also regulate the conduct of war through the 1949 
Geneva Conventions and other treaties. However, wars are still fought all over 
the globe with drastic deviations from the rules of engaging in warfare.140
 Spiritual and Military Jihād in the Qur’ān 
Jihād, both linguistically and as a technical term, means ‘struggle’, and is ety-
mologically related to the words mujahadah, which also means struggle or 
contention, and ijtihad, which is the efforts by jurists to arrive at correct judg-
ments in Islamic law.141 These terms derives from the verb jahada and the 
abstract noun, juhd which means the ‘exerted’, or in its juridical-theological 
meaning, the exertion of one’s power in Allah’s path.142 This is commonly 
understood to involve someone who is diligent in the pursuit of a praisewor-
thy objective and whose spiritual, intellectual and physical endeavours reflect 
a higher purpose in the pursuit of the undertaking.143 
The word itself comes from the root j / h / d, which in Arabic means to 
exert the most effort. This is a general term as one can exert effort in a vari-
ety of ways in fulfilling their goals and ambitions.144 Studies of the Qur’ān’s 
usage of the term jihād and its derivatives reveal that it includes five differ-
ent forms with a similar meaning (namely, jahada, jahd, juhd, jihād, mujah-
139 Dagli (n 41) 70.
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idun) appearing forty-one times in eighteen chapters (surahs).145 Contrary 
to popular Western belief,146 the term is not synonymous with war or fight-
ing since exertion in Allah’s path can be achieved by peaceful means.147 The 
Arabic equivalent of ‘war’ is ‘harb’ whilst the equivalent of fighting is ‘qital’.148 
It is important to distinguish between the three as the confusion surrounding 
these lexical terms has contributed to the common misconception that Islam 
is a religion of the sword, rather than a religion of peace. 
References to jihād can be found in 24 verses in the Qur’ān, most of which 
urge a spiritual struggle, such as focusing on being steadfast in sacrifice and 
faith, whilst some verses refer to jihād in the sense of armed resistance against 
the enemies of Islam.149 The notion of ‘exerting one’s power for God’ opens 
up doors for various alternatives as to what may constitute jihād.150 Since 
jihād incorporates both militant and non-militant elements, Muslim jurists 
have identified four ways in which a Muslim can perform their jihād obliga-
tion: by his heart, by his tongue, by his hands and by the sword.151 Fulfilling 
jihād by the heart is so significant in the eyes of God and his messenger, the 
Prophet Muhammad, that it is often referred to as the ‘greater jihād’ (al-jihād 
al-akbar). This is due to the required struggle against one’s evil inclinations, to 
combat the devil and evade one’s own lust and desires.152 The Prophet himself 
said: ‘The best struggle is to struggle against your soul and your passions in the 
way of God Most High’.153 
Jihād of the sword on the other hand, known as the ‘lesser jihād’ (al-jihād 
al-asghar), requires taking part in actual fighting (qital) by sacrificing one’s life 
in the name of Allah.154 This kind of military jihād will be dealt with in details 
in the following sections. The fallacy surrounding the jihād doctrine, which 
since the 1970’s has been coined as a term attached to the ideological and mili-
tary agenda of fundamentalists, has overshadowed the spiritual and peaceful 
145 El Sayed M.A. Amin, Reclaiming Jihad: A Quranic Critique of Terrorism (The Islamic Foun-
dation 2014) 79–80. 
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underpinnings of Islam.155 In order to refute the justifications used by Islamic 
extremists it is paramount to note that the Prophet Muhammed placed jihād 
of the heart above the jihād of the sword. When the Prophet Muhammad 
returned from the battle of Tabuk he said: ‘We have returned from the lesser 
jihād to the greater jihād’.156 Some have questioned the authenticity of this 
hadith; however, its meaning is confirmed by many others that place the 
efforts required in the spiritual life over that of physical combat.157 
In order to combat the radical interpretation of the doctrine of jihād used 
by Da‘esh one must understand the theological roots and its evolution dur-
ing the early period of Islam. When analysing the Qur’ānic revelations of this 
period an objective approach to Qur’ānic exegesis must be taken where the 
exegete collects all the relevant verses and analyses them collectively, tak-
ing into consideration the environment in which they were revealed without 
imposing a personal interpretation on any verse.158 
 The Theological Evolution of Jihād 
To truly understand jihād as a means of waging war, it is important to look 
at the origins of Islam in which the doctrine gradually evolved. During the 
Prophet Muhammad’s lifetime, the notion of jihād acquired various mean-
ings in line with the historical predicaments faced by the Muslim commu-
nity. Accordingly, it moved from a pacifist character to that of a defensive 
one, whilst its spiritual value remained prevalent throughout.159 The Prophet 
Muhammad lived and received his early revelations in the city of Mecca. This 
period, known as the jahiliyyah (age of ignorance), was marked by polythe-
ism, corruption, idolatry and immorality. It was here that the Prophet chal-
lenged the status quo, calling for justice and equality; he summoned the 
people to strive (jihād) to live a life based on Islamic principles.160 From 
610–622 C.E. Muhammad practised and proclaimed a peaceful policy of non-
resistance in the face of intensifying humiliation, cruelty and violence at the 
155 A.A. Badawi, Islam Hadhari: A Model Approach for Development and Progress (MPH Publi-
cations 2006) 68: ‘Muslim Scholars define jihād in terms of sustained effort to discipline 
one’s own self in obedience to Allah. Jihād also implies endeavour to uphold social justice, 
peace and fair play…It is most unfortunate that some have narrowed the concept of jihād 
to be synonymous with qital, which concerns physical fighting’. 
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hands of the Quraysh; the dominant tribe of Mecca.161 In 622 Muhammad and 
his small community of followers embarked on hijra (emigration) to Medina, 
giving birth to a new stage of Islam and thus, creating the ummah. After two 
years of continuous persecution, Muhammad announced a revelation from 
Allah permitting Muslims to physically defend themselves through means of 
force. It is believed by scholars that the Quranic verse 22:39 contained the first 
transformational statement of permission:162 
Verily Allah will defend (from ill) those who believe: verily, Allah loves 
not any that is a traitor to faith, or shows ingratitude. To those against 
whom war is made, permission is given (to fight), because they are 
wronged-and verily, Allah is most powerful for their aid.(they are) those 
who have been expelled from their homes in defiance of right (for no 
cause) except that they say, ‘Our Lord is Allah’ (Qur’ān 22:38–40).
It is evident from the wording of the above verse that Allah’s permission to 
engage in qital was formed on the grounds of self-defence in the face of attack 
and oppression. By looking at the phrase ‘to whom war is made’ one can see 
that permission is only given to fight when the other party has initiated an 
aggressive war. This corresponds directly with the first Qur’ānic passage on 
war, verse 2:190: ‘Fight in the cause of Allah those who fight you, but do not 
transgress limits: for Allah loves not the transgressors’ (Qur’ān 2:190). 
From looking at the origins of the term jihād, one can see that the spiri-
tual endeavour against oneself for piety, is a Muslim’s foremost duty. It was 
not until circumstances changed during the Prophet’s lifetime that the mil-
itary dimension of jihād developed to mean the continuous resistance 
against aggression, persecution and protection of the freedom of religion.163 
Furthermore, it must be remembered that the concept of ‘mercy’ forms the 
backbone of all Islamic rulings.164 It has been argued that all lawful qital is 
jihād; a legitimately approved and collective military struggle against evil, 
but not all jihād should be restricted to qital.165 There are no verses in the 
Qur’ān which permit the use of violence against non-combatants, irrespec-
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tive of their religious beliefs. Thus, the Qur’ān forbids killing whilst stressing 
the sanctity of human life: ‘Life, which Allah has made sacred’ (Qur’ān 6:151). 
Concluding with the words of Bassiouni, ‘[f]rom the days of the Prophet, 
jihad was subject to conditions as to its rightfulness, which we would today 
call the right to legitimate self-defence’.166 
 Jihād: A Perpetual State of War? 
The classical religious division of the world between ‘the abode of Islam’ (dār 
al-Islam) and the ‘abode of war’” (dār al-harb) has had a minimal effect on 
international relations in the modern day, however, it has formed the basis 
for non-state violence committed by extremists. As discussed above, whilst 
there are a number of references with regard to the conduct of Muslims 
towards non-Muslims in the Qur’ān as well as in the hadith, the classical dis-
tinction between the two abodes has no place in the Qur’ān whereas the only 
hadith narration cited in its support cannot be found in the collections of the 
authentic hadiths.167 Such a ‘dichotomous classification’, was ‘mainly based 
on the attitude of the Muslim state towards its enemies and friends’ dur-
ing this period’.168 Regardless of this, it forms the very heart of Da‘esh ideo-
logical narrative. The concept is a legal and political structure developed by 
classical jurists through means of ijtihad (logical deduction and interpre-
tation). Furthermore the Qur’ānic and Prophetic narratives with regards to 
the relations between the two abodes were formulated by jurists in terms 
of the historical progress made by the Islamic community through its early 
166 Bassiouni (n 138) 134. 
167 T. Roeder, ‘Traditional Islamic Approaches to Public International Law – Historic Con-
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expansionist battles.169 As such, aggressive war against non-believers was ex 
post facto legitimised after the early conquests from the late 8th century CE 
onwards.170 
This was in stark contrast to the original attitudes, during the time of the 
Prophet, when due to continuous persecution of the Muslim community, the 
desire to protect the ummah was the only goal which was juxtaposed with the 
use of force.171 It was furthermore in contrast with the earliest Sunni doctrine 
which allowed forceful jihād merely for self-defense and laid down the follow-
ing conditions for the permissibility of the use of force against non-Muslim 
controlled areas: the existence of a threat to the Muslim ummah (commu-
nity); opposing the propagation and practice of Islam; or/and a refusal to sign 
a peace treaty with the Muslim ummah.172 Muhammad al-Shaybani, known 
as the father of Islamic international law, thus laid down the regulations gov-
erning Islam’s external relations based on the assumption that a state of war 
existed between the two abodes, but made no explicit statement that jihād 
was to be waged against the unbelievers solely on account of disbelief. Hence, 
it is not the disbelief, which warrants the use of force, rather the hostility 
demonstrated by the unbelievers against Islam, for example, persecution of 
the Muslims.173 As mentioned above, all classical jurists however, considered 
Muslim territory governed by non-Muslim law or non-Muslim rulers to be dār 
al-hārb.
The very essence of the Salafi-jihadi creed to which Da‘esh adheres, depicts 
that their engagement in war is fundamentally legitimate through jus ad bel-
lum under Islamic international law. Da‘esh as well as many other radical con-
temporary Islamist groups, all of which identify with Salafism, see jihād as a 
war to eradicate political barriers and the liberation of humanity from sub-
jection to jahili man-made laws. A fundamental argument made on behalf of 
those in support of such thinking is that since the majority of classical jurists 
believed expansionary warfare as both permitted and obligatory, modern 
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Muslims should also adopt this view.174 Sayyid Qutb argued that verses in the 
Qur’ān which speak of peace or co-existence with unbelievers (e.g. Qur’ān 
8:61; 60:8; 2:190; 3:64) were temporary, provisional rulings abrogated by the 
final ruling revealed in9:5 of the Qur’ān.175 In response to the view that the 
doctrine of jihād is a perpetual state of war, one scholar explained that: 
They took the Qur’anic verses out of context and thus destroyed their 
significance. The Qur’an and the Sunnah ordered all-out war against the 
Arab pagans who were always referred to as Mushrikun (idolators or 
associators). Whenever the Qur’an speaks of these Arabs, it stresses their 
cruelty, treachery, hypocrisy, greed, savagery, etc. The Arabs who were the 
subject of these Qur’anic verses were mainly Bedouins who continually 
attacked and persecuted Muslims and betrayed their pledges... Islam 
developed an attitude of all-out war only against the Adnani bedouins 
and their Qurayshi leadership in their opposition to Islam.176
This kind of war was still self-defensive, even though it can be described as 
pre-emptive self-defence, since the Mushrikun were too unpredictable in 
their actions and broke by their pledges on such a continuous basis, that it 
would have been unreasonable to expect constructive diplomatic relations 
with them in order to avoid conflict. Here it becomes evident that Da‘esh 
adherence is to a distorted interpretation of Islam, not its genuine mean-
ing and is based on a misguided idea based on the realpolitik of the Abbasid 
period up until the demise of the Muslim hegemony. 
Just as the Qur’ān does not permit waging war on account of disbelief, 
it does not permit warfare as a means of promulgating Islam; rather it per-
mits freedom of belief for all of mankind.177 However, this is not the position 
taken by Da‘esh, which have specifically imposed the forceful conversion of 
Islam upon the Yezidi minority in Iraq. This directly flies in the face of Islamic 
teaching as the Qur’ān states: Unto your religion, and unto me my religion’ 
(Qur’ān 109:6), and ‘Whosoever will, let him believe, and whosoever will, let 
174 A.F. March and N.K. Modirzadeh, ‘Ambivalent Universalism? Ius ad Bellum in Modern 
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him disbelieve’ (Qur’ān 18:29), and ‘There is no compulsion in religion. The 
right direction is distinct from error (Qur’ān 2:256). 
The Qur’ānic verses reject any argument that Islam permits the forceful 
conversion of non-believers. Rather, it provides evidence to suggest that Islam 
is a religion of coexistence. However, the classical jurists such as Shafi‘ī have 
inspired the likes of Sayed Qutb in believing that the command to spread the 
word of Islam peacefully has been abrogated to permit the coercion of reli-
gious belief by the above mentioned Qur’ānic verse 9:5.178 They further find 
evidence for the support of their argument in the following hadith:
I have been commanded to fight the people until they bear witness that 
there is no divinity but God and Muhammad is God’s Messenger, perform 
the Prayer, pay the Alms. When they have done this their blood and prop-
erty is safe from me, except by the right of Islam and their reckoning with 
God.
This hadith would appear to contradict the notion that Islam is a religion of 
peace, however arguments that use examples such as these to support the 
abrogation of the peaceful propagation of Islam lack authoritative charac-
ter. The following Medinan verses, revealed after permission was given to the 
Muslims to resort to the use of force, make it clear that Islam endeavours for 
the truth to reach those yet to hear it, rather than forcing it upon them:179 ‘But 
if they are disregardful, We have not sent you as a keeper over them. Your duty 
is only to deliver the message’ (Qur’ān 42:48); ‘And whether We show you a 
part of that which We promise them, or We take you [To us], it is for you to 
convey [the Message], and it is for us to do the reckoning’ (Qur’ān 13:40). 
In recent history, several nation-States with predominantly Muslim popula-
tions have gained independence by waging what could be described as a just 
jihād against foreign occupation and a colonial ruler, a concept which would 
fit under the right to self-determination in international law. In a similar 
vein, the mujahedeen launched a protracted campaign against the Soviets in 
order to the removal of Russian forces from Afghanistan.180 However Da‘esh 
could not reasonably use this wider definition of defence of the ummah 
under the doctrine of jihād, for the following reasons. Even if Da‘esh believed 
Muslims had been wronged by certain actions of Western governments, the 
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fact that they are directing their aggression mainly against fellow Muslims 
and non-Muslim civilians, and not against those that have wronged them, 
takes away the possibility of using this wider notion of jihād as justification. 
Furthermore, instead of rectifying injustices, Da‘esh is creating additional suf-
fering and human rights abuses for millions of innocent people. Last but not 
least, Da‘esh is bringing even greater involvement of outside forces into the 
ummah by attracting international response in the form of airstrikes or possi-
bly even renewed Western occupation of majority-Muslim lands.
 Conclusions
Instead of following the defensive idea of jihād as prescribed in the Qur’ān 
and the vast majority of authentic hadith, IS claim justification for its aggres-
sive and murderous mission based mostly on the jurisprudence of the sev-
enth century, which followed the expansionary aspirations of the ummah at 
that time. However even the said jurisprudence understood jihād as permit-
ting warfare only against non-Muslims and apostates and strictly regulated 
in terms of jus in bello.181 Irregular warfare and terrorism against Muslims 
and non-Muslims alike on the other hand have been almost uniformly con-
demned in Islamic literature both classical and contemporary.182
Regardless of the terrorist element, the logic of a permanent state of war 
is neither realistic nor practical and with the evolution of the international 
landscape it has become obsolete. Due to the decentralisation of Islam which 
began to occur from the 10th century onwards, the principle of jihād as a 
collective duty to wage war against the unbeliever retained little of its sub-
stance.183 Furthermore, our analysis of the theological evolution of the mean-
ing of jihād shows that its belligerent side has experienced radical departures 
from its original meaning in order to fit the early expansionist agenda. By 
explaining the defensive character of the Qur’ānic narrative, this article has 
brought to light the perpetual misinterpretations in which the term jihād has 
come to be twisted even further in order to justify the endless violence per-
petrated by various Islamist groups. In the same vein, Da‘esh uses distorted 
applications of Islamic teaching in order to spread the territorial capacity of 
its control and to expand its version of Islam through means of forceful con-
version and the cleansing of society from those Muslims who do not adhere 
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to its radicalisation. Rebelling against rulers of Muslim majority states, IS, 
just like the Muhakkimah, have been using the banner of jihād to adopt and 
implement its extreme interpretation of Islamic principles. The irony is that 
while its leaders go about declaring other Muslims to not be Muslim enough, 
Da‘esh itself represent a group that has been rightly condemned as Khārijites, 
or in other words to have stepped outside of Islam by the rest of the Muslim 
community. The characteristically striking resemblance between IS and the 
primitive Muhakkimah reminds us of the cyclical nature of history and the 
need to effectively and authoritatively ascertain the true stance of Islam on 
these issues before a new group emerges with the same ideas.
A part of the problem lies in the fact that although Islamic teaching places 
comprehensive limitations on the lawful use of force, the seemingly non-
linear Qur’ānic position combined with an ambiguous division between the 
views of Muslim jurists has left the Islamic ius ad bellum many times in an 
equivocal position. However, the separation of the world into dār al-Islam 
(abode of Islam) and dār al-harb (abode of war) reflects the historical con-
text of the time in which politics followed an expansionary agenda. This 
was also influenced by the then international customary norm according to 
which it was considered a right of states to enter a state of war to ascertain 
an objective.184 Even in the rest of the world, it took centuries before the ‘just 
war’ doctrine could begin to limit the broad legal justifications for aggression, 
especially after undergoing secularism itself and renouncing the right to go 
to war for the sake of propagating one’s religion. Through the development of 
treaties such as the UN Charter, military aggression for the acquisition of ter-
ritory by law eventually became illegal. The same approach was established 
by the Qur’ān hundreds of years before, but has been neglected by those who 
seek to expand their power through manipulating religion ever since. Islam’s 
vision of human society underlies its conception of international law. Man 
created by God, is born good and the Qur’ān maintains him in this natural 
quality. As such, war is considered as contrary to human nature, for the essen-
tial foundation of man’s passage on this earth is peaceful. War, a reprehensible 
act for believers, may nevertheless be an unavoidable evil once it is necessary 
to repel an aggression and to defend Muslims when under threat, to thwart 
plots by their enemies to oppress and persecute them. 
The Qur’ānic concept of jihād almost entirely aligns itself with the princi-
ples of both Article 2(4) and Article 51 of the UN Charter.185 Jihād, like the UN 
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Charter, prohibits all use of force, except in very limited and exceptional cir-
cumstances, such as self-defence. However to a limited and reasonable extent, 
jihād extends a state’s power and discretion beyond the strict regulations set 
forth in the Charter. Where the Charter demands that, in order to trigger the 
right to self-defence under Article 51, there must be an actual armed attack 
by a state or state actor, the rules of jihād permit war even in situation where 
the attack is carried out by non-state actors.186 Since the prohibition against 
aggressive war constitutes today’s secular ius ad bellum norm, the religious 
justness of a given conflict clearly bears no relevance in determining whether 
the use of force by a State complies with the UN Charter.187 Under the UN col-
lective security system, the concept of bellum justum is replaced by that of 
bellum legale.188 As a result, the contemporary international regulation of 
warfare places no authority on the religious, theological and political justi-
fications for resorting to the use of force. Under international law, therefore, 
even legitimate jihād cannot pass for a legal justification if it falls outside the 
boundaries of the Charter. However, for groups such as IS and its supporters, 
international law and secularism present sinful systems, which are of no value 
to them. It is therefore important to stress that the actions of these extremist 
militants groups have no justification, even under the broadest definitions of 
permissible belligerent jihād.
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